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Many of our seminars and public events this year will continue as in person or as hybrid (online and in person) events.

Please check our website listings and Twitter feed @STICERD_LSE for updates.

Unless otherwise specified, in-person seminars are open to the public. Please ensure you have informed the event contact as early as possible.

Those unable to join the seminars in-person are welcome to participate via zoom if the event is hybrid.

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About this event

Motivated by the growing interest in geoeconomics, we develop a formal framework in which multiple superpowers?such as the United States and China?compete to shape the behavior of less powerful countries or firms. We model superpowers as competing principals who influence an agent?s policy choice by threatening costly punishments. We characterize the set of equi- librium policy choices as a system of incentive-compatibility constraints on each actor. Equilibrium policy choices tend to favor more powerful princi- pals, and larger policy concessions can be extracted when principals are more aligned. When all parties additionally have access to frictionless transfers, Coasian surplus-maximizing equilibria always exist regardless of the distribu- tion of punishment power, with power impacting only the division of surplus. However, this result no longer holds if frictions are introduced.