---

Many of our seminars and public events this year will continue as in person or as hybrid (online and in person) events.

Please check our website listings and Twitter feed @STICERD_LSE for updates.

Unless otherwise specified, in-person seminars are open to the public. Please ensure you have informed the event contact as early as possible.

Those unable to join the seminars in-person are welcome to participate via zoom if the event is hybrid.

---

About this event

In divided societies, high income inequality rarely produces class-based political coalitions. We test whether misperceptions about out-groups? economic conditions help explain such limited support for redistributive and cross-group policies. In a representative survey of 3,300 adults in Greater Beirut, respondents were randomly assigned to a seven-minute video documenting that income inequality between Lebanon's main religious groups, Sunni, Christian and Shia, are small, while overall inequality is high. The information produces a strong first stage: perceived inequality between sects falls by about 0.4 standard deviations and perceived similarity rises by about 0.3 standard deviations. These belief updates increase support for pro-poor redistribution, including higher top marginal tax rates and expanded social protection, and raise the salience of class identity. Political outcomes, however, do not move in the short-run. We find no detectable changes in support for the sectarian governance system, civil marriage, or a non-traditional political figure, and no effects on costlier behaviors such as volunteering with a cross-sect NGO, applying for a civic internship, or attending an anti-corruption workshop. In a candidate-choice conjoint experiment, shared religion remains the dominant predictor of vote choice. Light-touch interventions correcting misperceptions can move redistributive preferences and identity salience, but are insufficient to erode sectarian attachments or spur costly engagement.