Skip to main content

STICERD Economic Theory Seminars

Knowledge Economies

Krittanai Laohakunakorn (Surrey), joint with Guilherme Carmona and Hitoshi Tsujiyama

Thursday 04 June 2026 15:30 - 17:00


Many of our seminars and public events this year will continue as in person or as hybrid (online and in person) events.

Please check our website listings and social media feeds @STICERD_LSE at X and @LSE-STICERD-CASE at Bluesky for updates.

To subscribe to our mailing list, please click here.

Unless otherwise specified, in-person seminars are open to the public. Please ensure you have informed the event contact as early as possible.

Those unable to join the seminars in-person are welcome to participate via zoom if the event is hybrid.


About this event

We develop a general framework for knowledge economies which feature occupational choice between workers and managers and many-to-one matching of workers to managers into firms whose production depends on members' knowledge. The framework is flexible and nests several existing models as special cases. We establish existence of a stable outcome and show that, in our setting, stability is equivalent to competitive equilibrium and surplus maximization. We provide sufficient conditions under which stable outcomes admit a sharp characterization featuring positive assortativeness, occupation stratification, and strictly increasing earnings, and we show that these conditions hold in a range of knowledge economies. Quantitatively, the model in Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2004) accounts for U.S. wage polarization over 1988-2008, but a more flexible model is needed to account for both wage polarization and the U.S. establishment-size distribution. The flexible economy also replicates top income shares and their evolution remarkably well.