STICERD Economic Theory Seminars
Generous Long-Term Contracts
Sylvain Chassang (Princeton University)
Thursday 11 June 2026 15:30 - 17:00
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About this event
I argue that in long-term consumer?producer relationships, menus of contracts can be advantageously replaced by a single generous contract such that, at any point in time, the sum of a consumer?s transfers is equal to the sum of transfers they would have made under the contract that is the best for them in hindsight. Such generous long-term contracts can increase skeptical consumers? demand for complex and higher-powered contracts while approximately implementing the same outcomes as the underlying menu evaluated by a rational decision maker. Applications include voluntary load shedding in retail electricity markets and cost sharing in health insurance.