---

Many of our seminars and public events this year will continue as in person or as hybrid (online and in person) events.

Please check our website listings and Twitter feed @STICERD_LSE for updates.

Unless otherwise specified, in-person seminars are open to the public. Please ensure you have informed the event contact as early as possible.

Those unable to join the seminars in-person are welcome to participate via zoom if the event is hybrid.

---

About this event

Can revolutions in ethnically segregated societies create inclusive democracies? Nepal, a multi-ethnic country that had been a monarchy for 240 years, became a federal democratic republic in 2015 after a ten-year People's War and a decade-long constitution design process. The new constitution delegated significant policy powers to elected local governments. Using merged census and electoral data, we show that Nepal's historically disempowered indigenous ethnic groups (Janajatis), who account for more than a third of the country's population, won proportional representation in local leadership positions in the 2017 democratic election. We provide evidence that Janajatis' representation on party selection committees was an important channel for achieving this representation. Moreover, caste-leadership Implicit Association Tests (IATs) reveal that party elites involved in candidate selection have an implicit bias against Janajatis, with Janajati party elites having a lesser bias. We trace the origins of Janajati representation in party leadership positions back to the governance structure of the Maoist group, which spearheaded the People's War and incorporated Janajatis in revolutionary governance institutions. The Maoists subsequently entered democratic Nepali politics, and Janajati representation was highest for the Maoist party. Moreover, political inclusion is persistent, with Janajatis expanding their electoral share in 2022. Finally, turning to the targeting of the largest locally delivered program (post-earthquake housing reconstruction transfers), we do not observe ethnic favoritism. Rather, consistent with electoral incentives, Janajati leaders favor the population majority group in their constituency.